Neither Generalism not Particularism: Ethical Correctness is located in General Ethical Theories by Singleton, J.
Neither Generalism nor Particularism: Ethical Correctness is located in General Ethical 
Theories 
 
1. Introduction 
In order to evaluate the merits of particularism and generalism, we need to isolate precisely what is 
the main point of contention between the two views. This is not an easy matter and there have been 
many attempts at capturing this difference.i I shall argue that the difference lies in what is taken as 
the locus of ethical correctness. The particularist takes this to lie in judgements about particular 
cases and the generalist denies this and claims that the priority is located in general principles. I 
shall dispute both these claims by arguing that ethical correctness is located in ethical theories and 
that these should not be equated with a list of general principles. 
 
I need to clarify two points about this claim before proceeding. In talking about ethical correctness, 
I am not claiming that there is always a uniquely correct answer to every moral problem. Indeed, 
my discussion of judgemental generalism in section four of this paper indicates some of the areas 
where there could be moral disagreement. Second, I am not suggesting that the task of moral 
judgements is solely to identify correct answers in an impassive, theoretical way. Judging morally 
is intimately connected with how we live our lives and the sort of people that we are. It is because 
of this that it is so important to identify where ethical correctness lies. 
 
Roger Crisp has noted that “generalism is now the standard term for the contrary to particularism.”ii 
Whilst I accept this, in order to locate the precise nature of the difference between the two doctrines 
I argue that it is necessary to distinguish two types of generalism: subsumptive and judgemental 
generalism. This latter form of generalism allows us to locate much more precisely the essential 
point of difference between particularism and generalism since it allows such a large scope for 
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attention to the particular case without it being a particularist doctrine. Jonathan Dancy, for 
example, considers that it is a particular danger of generalism that it allows insufficient attention to 
the particular case. He writes, 
 
It is this sort of looking away that particularists see as the danger of generalism. Reasons 
function in new ways on new occasions, and if we don’t recognise this fact and adapt our 
practice to it, we will make bad decisions. Generalism encourages a tendency not to look 
enough at the details of the case before one.iii
 
As I will show, judgemental generalism requires a detailed examination of the particular case. This 
discussion of judgemental generalism which, I argue, is to be preferred to subsumptive generalism, 
naturally leads to the reason for going beyond this and locating ethical correctness in ethical 
theories. These theories provide the guiding rationale for what is regarded as ethically correct. 
 
I will show then that generalists, per se, are not debarred from paying attention to the specific case. 
Principles can be applied to specific cases and this does not involve a “looking away” from the 
particular case. The kind of sensitivity that particularists claim is necessary for judging the morality 
of specific cases is not something that is denied to generalists. Dancy, for example, writes of the 
person on whom we can rely “to make sound moral judgements,” that she will have “a broad range 
of sensitivities” and “to have the relevant sensitivities just is to be able to get things right case by 
case.”iv John McDowell makes a similar point, “Occasion by occasion, one knows what to do, if 
one does, not by applying universal principles but by being a certain kind of person: one who sees 
situations in a certain distinctive way.”v Sensitivity to particular cases, seeing situations in a 
distinctive way, is something that generalism can allow. This is not to say that all generalist theses 
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allow this but just that this sort of attention to particular cases is not incompatible with generalism 
per se, understood as involving, in some sense, the application of universal principles.  
 
I shall take Kant’s view as an example of judgemental generalism and use this to illustrate what I 
mean by claiming that ethical correctness is located in ethical theories rather than in the perception 
of particular situations. My aim is not to provide a defence of Kant’s view per se, but rather to 
argue for the advantage of looking to ethical theories for the locus of ethical correctness, rather than 
judgements about particular situations. 
 
2. Particularism 
I shall concentrate on particularism as a thesis about reasons, at least initially, in order to locate the 
essence of the difference between particularism and generalism. There are two reasons for this. 
First, the essence of the doctrine is clearly stated by Dancy in this form.vi Second, if this is 
accepted, similar arguments apply to all other versions of particularism since they are all based on 
the same argument for holism that Dancy advances. Dancy indicates that he supports particularism 
on the basis that holism as a theory of normative reasons is correct when he writes: “particularism 
(which is merely an application of holism in the general theory of reasons to the moral case).”vii  It 
is this holism in the theory of reasons that generalists, by their acceptance of moral principles, have 
to reject. In particular, in discussing particularism about reasons, reference will be made to 
principles that are cited as reasons, so a separate section is not included devoted to particularism in 
rules or principles.viii  
 
Dancy emphasises that his ethical particularism is based on a commitment to holism in a theory of 
normative reasons. He expresses this thesis as follows: 
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1. What is a reason in one situation may alter or lose its polarity in another. 
2. The way in which the reasons here present combine with each other is not necessarily 
determinable in any simply additive way.ix
 
In the specific case of morality, Dancy makes it clear that moral principles specify the features that 
are the reasons to which generalists appeal. He writes, 
 
Moral principles, however we conceive of them, seem all to be in the business of specifying 
features as general  reasons. The principle that it is wrong to lie, for instance, presumably 
claims that mendacity is always a wrong making feature whenever it occurs ( pro tanto , of 
course, not necessarily absolutely).x
 
If moral reasons function holistically in the way indicated in the general specification above, then: 
“it cannot be the case that the possibility of such reasons rests on the existence of principles that 
specify morally relevant features as functioning atomistically. A principle-based approach to ethics 
is inconsistent with the holism of reasons.”xi If we take the example of the reason that it is wrong to 
lie, Dancy’s point expressed in (1) above is that it might not always have the polarity of being a 
wrong making characteristic since it could, in some contexts, turn out to be a right making 
characteristic or even to have no significance at all, in the sense of not being regarded as a reason at 
all in some contexts. 
 
The second point is not wholly clear since Dancy provides no explanation of it in the section of his 
article devoted to holism in the theory of reasons.xii However, what he appears to have in mind, and 
what I shall assume he intends, is clarified by the discussion of organic wholes that occurs in his 
discussion of holism in the theory of value. The value of the parts of the whole cannot be looked at 
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atomistically and from this a deduction made about the value of the whole. Although this view of 
Dancy’s sounds the same as Moore’s doctrine of the value of organic wholes, Dancy’s explanation 
of this feature involves, as we shall see, rejecting Moore’s view. 
 
Before examining Dancy’s thesis and supporting arguments in more detail, which I do in section 
six below, I should like to point out some implications of this view. The first concerns the notion of 
priority. Dancy’s view implies that the particular is prior in at least the following senses: 
 
(i) The particular determines what will count as a reason. The particular situation needs 
to be inspected first to determine what is a reason in this situation and what value 
and importance it has. 
(ii) The particular is prior in the sense that the evaluation of the particular has authority 
over any general reason with which it might conflict. The locus of ethical 
correctness lies in the particular. 
 
A second implication implicit in Dancy’s characterization is that we clearly need to exercise 
judgement about the case before us. I will be showing that this feature is not distinctive of 
particularism, since it is also essential for the form of generalism that I call judgemental 
generalism. 
 
A third implication is that this account of particularism implies the falsity of the universalizability 
thesis. This is because the thesis of universalizability incorporates the claim that if we judge one 
action to be right then we must judge any relevantly similar action to be right, “An action is said to 
be relevantly similar if, roughly, it shares with the first all the properties which were reasons why 
the first action was right.”xiii Given Dancy’s thesis about the holism of reasons, - whereby what is a 
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reason in a particular case might change its polarity or be no reason at all in another case, - we can 
see why the rejection of universalizability might lead to particularism. I shall be discussing this 
issue in section five below. 
 
I shall be defending the version of generalism that I call judgemental generalism in opposition to 
this characterization of particularism. My defence will show that this form of generalism 
incorporates the second implication noted above and therefore that this is not distinctive of the 
difference between generalism and particularism. I shall also defend the universalizability thesis by 
considering the case of Billy Budd, which is sometimes taken to provide a reason for rejecting the 
universalizability thesis. If this defence is successful, it will provide an argument against 
particularism. In section six I shall return to Dancy’s support for his thesis and my criticisms, if 
correct, will provide further support for generalism understood as the contrary of particularism. 
This will leave the priority point as the main point of contention between generalism and 
particularism. In arguing against locating ethical priority in the particular, I shall show, by using the 
example of Kant’s ethics, that ethical priority should be located not in generalism per se, but in the 
ethical theory in which such generalism is grounded. 
 
I will begin by outlining the two types of generalism - subsumptive and judgemental - to show the 
senses in which the latter requires judgement of the particular case. 
 
3. Subsumptive Generalism 
 
As I mentioned above, generalists per se are not debarred from paying attention to specific cases. 
However, what I will call subsumptive generalism, as opposed to judgmental generalism, does 
preclude sensitivity to particular cases. Subsumptive generalism is a form of generalism that 
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involves equating principles with rules. Rules apply in an all or nothing fashion and, as Dworkin 
writes, “If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer 
it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision.”xiv
 
As an example, if we have the general rule “one ought to tell the truth” and a particular case where 
this is an issue, then it automatically follows that in this case one ought to tell the truth. This moral 
judgement is deduced from the general principle. 
 
This sort of generalism is deeply implausible. There might be many occasions where, for example, 
to tell the truth would cause immense distress, but the mechanical application of the rule “one 
ought to tell the truth” would dictate that the truth ought to be told. It suffers from the further 
implausibility that situations can arise where two conflicting rules could apply when it cannot be 
our duty to do both. My claim is not that there are generalists advocating subsumptive generalism, 
but that this sort of picture of generalism is what is implied by some particularists when they are 
criticising generalism. An example of this would be Dancy’s remarks quoted earlier when he 
claims that generalist doctrines “look away” from particular cases. 
 
4. Judgemental Generalism – Kantian Ethics 
 
I shall be using Kantian Ethics as an example of judgemental generalism. This will be used to show 
that this form of generalism includes an ineliminable role for judgement and, thus, that this feature 
noted as the second implication of Dancy’s characterization of particularism cannot be taken as a 
feature that distinguishes generalism from particularism. Far from encouraging “a tendency not to 
look enough at the details of the case before one”xv, judgemental generalism requires a detailed 
examination of the particular case. 
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 However, since my ultimate thesis is that the locus of ethical correctness lies in ethical theories, I 
shall give a rough idea of the distinction within Kantian Ethics of what I mean by distinguishing 
ethical theory and general principles. I will accept, in an initially uncritical way, Bernard 
Williams’s definition of an ethical theory. He says: “An ethical theory is a theoretical account of 
what ethical thought and practice are, which account either implies a general test for the correctness 
of basic ethical beliefs and principles or else implies that there cannot be such a test.”xvi  
 
The general test for correctness incorporated in Kantian Ethics is encapsulated in the Categorical 
Imperative: “Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law.”xvii Whilst this might be used as a test of specific maxims, there are certain general 
principles or maxims that Kant suggests pass this test. In the infamous four illustrations of this test 
in practice we have generated the following general principles: “One ought not to commit suicide”, 
“One ought to keep promises”, “One ought to utilise one’s talents” and “One ought to help 
others”xviii The first two principles are examples of perfect duties, recognized by the fact that there 
is a contradiction in the universal form of their denial. The infringement of perfect duties would 
seem then to be something that is never allowable and, therefore, might seem to allow no room for 
judgement. The latter two examples express imperfect duties recognized by the fact that the 
contradiction in their denial is not a contradiction in the universal form of the maxim, but a 
contradiction in willing it in the universal form.xix  
 
The first role for judgement in this example of judgemental generalism is a role that is common to 
all principles, whether they express perfect or imperfect duties. Kant explicitly recognises that the 
application of principles requires judgement and that this cannot be explained in terms of the 
application of a further general rule or principle. He writes: 
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 So judgement itself must provide a concept, a concept through which we do not actually 
cognize anything but which only serves as a rule for the power of judgement itself – but not 
as an objective rule, to which it could adapt its judgement, since then we would need 
another power of judgement in order to decide whether or not the judgement is a case of 
that rule.xx
 
Principles cannot be applied without a judgement to determine their applicability to a particular 
case and this cannot be formulated in general terms but is determinable by the particular case. Kant 
makes this completely explicit when he says: 
 
It is obvious that between theory and practice there is required, besides, a middle term 
connecting them and providing a transition from one to the other, no matter how complete a 
theory may be; for, to a concept of the understanding, which contains a rule, must be added 
an act of judgment by which a practitioner distinguishes whether or not something is a case 
of the rule; and since judgment cannot always be given yet another rule by which to direct 
its subsumption (for this would go on to infinity).xxi  
 
If we take the perfect duty not to commit suicide or, put positively, to preserve our life, then this 
does not imply that in a particular case someone should never take their life. Judgement is required 
to determine whether or not the particular case is an example of suicide. Kant makes this clear in 
his discussion of the casuistical questions that follow his discussion of killing oneself in The 
Doctrine of Virtue. He says: “Is it murdering oneself to hurl oneself to certain death (like Curtius) 
in order to save one’s country? - or is deliberate martyrdom, sacrificing oneself for the good of all 
humanity, also to be considered an act or heroism?”xxii Judgement of the particular case, which is a 
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difficult matter as Kant makes clear from these examples, is necessary to know whether the general 
principle applies in this case. It is clearly not the case that all acts of killing oneself are deemed to 
be wrong, but only those that are judged to be cases of suicide rather than cases of heroism, 
martyrdom or some other case. The duty encapsulated in the prohibition on committing suicide is 
absolute but we need judgement to determine when we have a case of suicide. A similar point can 
be made with the perfect duty to tell the truth where we can see that this does not imply that one 
should never tell an untruth. We need to exercise judgement to determine whether the particular 
case is a genuine case of a lie. As Kant writes, “Can an untruth from mere politeness (e.g., the ‘your 
obedient servant’ at the end of a letter) be considered a lie? No one is deceived by it.”xxiii
 
In the case of the imperfect duties, the necessity for judgement in particular cases is built into them 
at the general level in Kant’s account of what it is to be an imperfect duty. The necessity for 
judgement arises from two features of the general account given of imperfect duties. The duty to 
develop our talents and help others that were isolated in the Groundwork are further specified in the 
Metaphysics of Morals and labelled the two duties of virtue. The duty we owe to our own 
perfection is specified as not just developing our talents but also as morally perfecting ourselves. 
The duty of virtue that we owe to others is the duty to seek their happiness.xxiv However, there is no 
ranking given to these two within the general theory and so judgement would be needed in the 
particular case if we had to choose between imperfect duties generated by these two duties of 
virtue. 
 
The second feature of the general account of imperfect duties that implies the necessity for 
judgement in the particular case arises from the nature of an imperfect duty. There is no 
specification, at a general level of, for example, what talents we should be developing or how much 
we should be developing them. Kant writes, 
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 No rational principle prescribes specifically how far one should go in cultivating one’s 
capacities … Then too, the different situations in which human beings may find themselves 
make a human being’s choice of the occupation for which he should cultivate his talents 
very much a matter for him to decide as he chooses.xxv
 
Similarly, there is no general account about who we should be helping or how much we should be 
helping them. These duties are wide ones that incorporate a latitude in their application that is 
determined in the particular cases.xxvi  
 
Finally, judgement is also needed where we think that two general principles are applicable in a 
particular case, but the performance of one precludes the other. We have to determine by a 
consideration of the particular case what is our actual duty. Kant distinguishes between what he 
calls “grounds of obligation” which would refer to the two principles that we consider apply to this 
particular case, and “obligation” to reflect this difference. Kant maintains that a conflict of duties is 
impossible: 
 
a subject may have, in a rule he prescribes to himself, two grounds  of obligation (rationes 
obligandi), one or the other of which is not sufficient to put him under obligation (rationes 
obligandi non obligantes), so that one of them is not a duty. - When two such grounds 
conflict with each other, practical philosophy says, not that the stronger obligation takes 
precedence (fortior obligatio vincit), but that the stronger ground of obligation  prevails 
(fortior obligandi ratio vincit).xxvii
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I shall have something more to say about the rationale governing this judgement of particular cases 
when supporting my claim that the locus of ethical correctness lies in ethical theories. However, 
before considering this question, I shall defend the thesis of universalizability by considering the 
case of Billy Budd which has been advanced as a counter example to this thesis. If Dancy is correct 
to claim that particularism is incompatible with universalizability; then, if I can defend 
universalizability against attack, this will provide indirect support for generalism. 
 
5. Universalizability and Billy Budd 
 
Dancy considers that generalism in the theory of reasons embodies a commitment to 
universalizability. This is because the thesis of universalizability incorporates the claim that if we 
judge one action to be right then we must judge any relevantly similar action to be right. He says, 
“An action is said to be relevantly similar if, roughly, it shares with the first all the properties which 
were reasons why the first action was right.”xxviii Given Dancy’s thesis about the holism of reasons 
whereby what is a reason in a particular case might change its polarity or be no reason at all in 
another case, we can see why the rejection of universalizability might lead to particularism. 
 
However, this still leaves open the question of whether or not universalizability should be rejected 
as a theory. A case that has been discussed frequently in the literature that appears to cast  doubt on 
universalizability is the case of Melville’s Billy Budd, Sailor.xxix  I will show in my discussion that 
this case does not damage Kantian generalism and therefore does not damage generalism per se. 
 
The case described by Melville is where Captain Vere is faced with the decision of whether or not 
to execute Billy Budd. Budd has been falsely accused of attempted mutiny by Claggart, a corrupt 
Master of Arms, and whilst attempting to defend himself against the charge strikes Claggart with a 
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blow that kills him. Although Captain Vere believes in Budd’s innocence, since he has killed 
Claggart he feels unable to prevent him from hanging. Indeed, he takes the decision immediately 
before the court hearing and subsequently makes it clear at the hearing that his first obligation is to 
martial law and that would decree death for what is viewed as a capital crime. Winch’s discussion 
of this case provides the starting point of the debate. Winch claims that Vere’s decision to have 
Billy Budd hung was the right thing for him to do but Winch claims that, by appealing to the same 
considerations to which Captain Vere appealed , he would not have found it possible to condemn 
Budd. 
 
This example is illustrative of two features . The first is that we have a case where there is a 
genuine moral dilemma and the considerations are very finely balanced. There is no clear “right” 
answer. These finely balanced cases are the sort that Kant discusses in the casuistical questions 
referred to earlier where it is not clear from a consideration of the ethical theory alone which 
decision should be taken. In Kantian terms, if what is taken to be of ultimate value is rational 
nature, it is not clear what course of action will constitute respecting rational nature. These are the 
sort of cases I had in mind when I mentioned at the start of the article that I was not claiming that 
ethical correctness implies that there is a uniquely correct answer to every moral problem. 
 
Second, we have a case where there is a difference between the first person evaluation of the case 
and a third person evaluation of the case. Winch recognises the same considerations that Captain 
Vere recognises and appreciates that it was right for Vere to have Budd hung; but, Winch, whilst 
appealing to the same considerations, would have found it impossible to condemn Billy Budd. 
Budd’s innocence of both plotting mutiny and of intentional murder would not be overridden by the 
dictates of martial law for Winch. 
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The point at issue is that we cannot retain universalizability by claiming that the situations would 
be relevantly different if it was Winch or Vere making the decision because their differences of 
character are not a consideration to which either are appealing. However, it is their different 
characters that make it right for Vere to condemn Budd and for Winch not to be able to. 
 
This leads Joseph Raz to argue that since they are appealing to the same considerations or the same 
reasons, this case shows, as Winch points out, that reasons for action are not universalizable.xxx 
However, Raz retains universalizability by claiming that the difference between Vere’s decision 
and Winch’s decision is explicable in terms that are universalizable but are not reasons. These are 
the different characters of Vere and Winch and the fact that they decided as they did.xxxi Crisp takes 
a different line by concentrating on the fact that this is a finely balanced case and universalizability 
can be retained by claiming that either evaluation is permissible.  
 
I disagree with both of these analyses. The mistake made by Winch, Crisp and Raz is to claim that 
Vere and Winch are appealing to the same considerations or reasons. This allows the anti-
universalists too much. In the sort of judgemental generalism that I was illustrating by referring to 
Kant’s ethics, judgement is needed when these casuistical questions arise to determine what sort of 
case it is. Is it, for example, a case of innocent self-defence or is it a case of intentional murder? 
What will determine what will count as reasons will depend on the judgement taken at this point 
and this will vary depending on the judgement made. 
 
What I have in mind can be illustrated in the following case taken from Kant’s Metaphysics of 
Morals. Kant says, 
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A man who had been bitten by a mad dog already felt hydrophobia coming on. He 
explained in a letter he left, that, since as far as he knew the disease was incurable, he was 
taking his life lest he harm others as well in his madness (the onset of which he already 
felt.)xxxii  
 
These reasons make perfect sense as the reasons given by this man who considered that the right 
action to take was to take his life because he judged the case to be that of preventing harm to 
others. However, these “same considerations or reasons” would not have been appealed to by 
someone who considered that this was primarily a case of suicide and as such unjustified. Rather, 
the case would have been judged as, for example, a case of removing something of intrinsic value; 
debasing humanity. One only has to imagine how strange it would be for someone who judged this 
to be a case of suicide and therefore wrong, but gave as their reasons for this judgement those 
considerations cited by the person who judged it to be a case of not harming others. The wrongness 
of suicide and the duty we have not to harm others are universalizable, but first judgement needs to 
be exercised to determine what sort of case we have in this particular instance. In these finely 
balanced cases, a general theory can be held whilst recognizing that this might result in different 
evaluations in these sorts of finely balanced cases. 
 
If this defence of universalizability from this sort of attack is accepted, then this gives a further 
reason for rejecting particularism since, as we have seen, particularism implies the falsity of 
universalizability  In the next section, I want to argue against particularism directly by criticising 
the support that Dancy provides for this thesis. 
 
6. Dancy’s Particularism 
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As I mentioned in the second section of this paper, Dancy expresses his thesis as follows: 
 
1. What is a reason in one situation may alter or lose its polarity in another. 
2. The way in which the reasons here present combine with each other is not necessarily 
determinable in any simply additive way.xxxiii
 
In his book Moral Reasons, Dancy argues for the first point in his characterisation of the holism of 
reasons by way of examples. He gives an example where something that would usually be a reason 
is not a reason at all in a particular case. He also gives an example where a reason changes its 
polarity. 
 
Dancy puts forward an example to illustrate a case where something that was a reason in other 
cases would not be a reason in the example he is considering. If I have borrowed a book from you, 
then I have from that perspective a reason to return it. However, if the book was stolen by you from 
the library, then I have, from that perspective, a reason to return it to the library rather than to you. 
This, according to Dancy, might be how one might characterise the situation from a generalist’s 
perspective. However, Dancy claims that I have no reason at all to return it to you since it was 
stolen. That is not a reason in this sort of case that has to be weighed against the other 
considerations.xxxiv  
 
However, it is surely not correct to attribute this view to the generalists. To describe the fact that I 
have a reason to return the book to you from the perspective that I borrowed it from you is not 
correct. It could not be described accurately as a case of borrowing since I cannot borrow a book 
from you unless you lend it to me. However, you cannot lend what is not yours and so since the 
stolen book is not yours, you do not lend it (although you may act as though you were doing that) 
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and therefore I do not borrow it. Generalists look at the case and consider what moral principles are 
applicable and clearly this would not be regarded as a genuine case of borrowing. Dancy, with no 
supporting argument, has just not allowed this information to be included, forcing the generalist to 
view it as a simple case of borrowing. This is an example of a particularist characterising all 
generalism as though it has to be the implausible subsumptive generalism that I mentioned earlier. 
Without a supplementary argument to show that generalists cannot consider the specific case and 
make a judgement about whether or not a principle is applicable here, Dancy has not proved his 
case. 
 
Yet, Dancy also provides an example where a reason changes its polarity. “One ought not to lie” 
might on many occasions be taken to be a reason against telling an untruth but there are occasions 
when lying is required and the fact that something is a lie is a reason in favour of the action. The 
example is one of a game where the whole purpose of the game would be destroyed if the 
participants did not lie. However, this is surely not a problem for generalists. Again, the only way 
for Dancy’s argument to work is if the situation is wrongly described. We do not have here a case 
where lying simpliciter is being taken as a reason in favour, but where lying in the strictly defined 
context of a game is being recommended. Kant, for example, is quite clear that judgement is 
needed in particular cases in order to determine what principles are applicable. In his discussion of 
the casuistical questions, for example, he writes, “Can an untruth from mere politeness ... be 
considered a lie.”xxxv We could rephrase Kant’s casuistical question here and ask, “Can an untruth 
in the context of a game that requires lies be considered a genuine lie?” 
 
The replies to these examples illustrate that judgement is involved in particular cases to determine 
an interpretation of the case to see whether or not we really have, for example, a case of borrowing. 
Acceptance of generalism does not commit us to some mechanical, unthinking application of 
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principles to particular cases, as might be suggested in subsumptive generalism, but allows for 
judgement in interpreting the case. On the basis of these examples, Dancy has not shown that 
reasons either change their polarity or cease to be reasons in new cases. 
 
What about the second point in Dancy’s characterisation of the holism of reasons? The claim here 
is that the way in which the reasons here present combine is not necessarily determinable in any 
simply additive way. What Dancy has in mind, at least in the connection with the thesis of the 
holism in the theory of valuexxxvi is expressed by him as, “The value of a complex or whole is not 
necessarily identical with the sum of the values of its elements or parts.”xxxvii  Moore also held this 
view and gave, as an example, that the consciousness of a beautiful object is more valuable than the 
separate value of the consciousness and the value of the beautiful object added together. The 
thought being that the value of the object, if no one were conscious of it, would be very little. 
Similarly, mere consciousness does not always confer great value.xxxviii
 
The difference between Moore and Dancy, as well as the difference which concerns us, is that they 
provide different explanations for this phenomenon. Moore holds that these separate components 
always retain the same value although the value of the whole may be greater than the value of these 
parts. Dancy, on the other hand, is arguing that the value of these parts cannot be viewed 
atomistically. Moore’s view assumes a particular doctrine of supervenience whereby the value of 
each of the parts remains the same. These values are dependent on the separate parts of the whole 
but when these qualities are combined in a complex whole, the value of the whole is not necessarily 
the same as the sum of the value of the parts. 
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Whilst still supporting a doctrine of supervenience, whereby value supervenes on other qualities X, 
Dancy considers that the value can change even if X has not changed on this occasion. It can 
change because of other qualities in which this value forms part of a complex. He writes,  
 
intrinsic value is value that results from intrinsic properties of the object concerned, 
but...that value can vary because of changes elsewhere, that is, in those properties whose 
presence or absence can make a difference to the ability of the intrinsic properties to 
generate the value they do.xxxix  
 
He summarises his position in the following claim, “My doctrine, then, is a sort of global 
supervenience, since the supervenience base is cast so wide, while Moore’s is a sort of local 
supervenience.”xl
 
This explanation is damaging to Dancy’s account since it would appear to involve a denial of the 
second point of his characterisation of holism in the theory of value. The value of the complex 
whole will be identical with the value of the parts because the value of the parts will be determined 
in part by the context of this particular whole of which they form a part. Consequently, we do not 
have a case where the value of the whole is not identical with the value of the sum of its parts. This 
is essentially because the values of the parts have changed because of the particular whole in which 
they are located, and therefore this allegedly second feature of the holism of value or reasons seems 
to have collapsed into the first point. It just seems to be an explanation of the claim that the polarity 
of reasons or value might vary from occasion to occasion. Presumably, this variation is explicable 
in terms of Dancy’s “global supervenience” and, if this is the case, the second point in the 
characterisation of holism of reasons is not a distinct point from the first, against which I have 
already argued. 
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 It might be considered that Dancy could reply to this argument in terms of a refinement that he 
makes to his position in a recent article.xli Here instead of asserting without qualification that “The 
value of a complex or whole is not necessarily identical with the sum of the values of its elements 
or parts” (henceforward to be referred to as N.I, the Non-Identity Claim), he claims, 
 
But it is also true that some features that have value in that context do not contribute that 
value to the value of the whole. Their value cannot be put toward the value of the whole. In 
that sense, the value of the whole is not identical to the sum of the value of all the parts. But 
the value of the whole is identical to the sum of the values of the contributing parts, as we 
might put it. Any part, then, that contributes value must have that value to contribute, but 
some valuable parts do not contribute their value to the whole, even though their presence is 
necessary for the whole to have the value it does.xlii
 
The essence of this later position is the distinction that is now being drawn explicitly between: 
 
(i) A part of a whole that does not contribute value to the whole but its presence is 
necessary for the whole to have the value that it does. 
(ii) A part of a whole that does contribute value to the whole. 
 
In terms of this then, N.I will remain true if by parts we intend either (i) or both (i) and (ii) but if we 
just mean (ii) then N.I become false. In other words, interpreted in this latter way, Dancy will no 
longer be holding the same view as Moore, since Moore’s claim applies to all the parts of the 
whole. Although, of course, even when Dancy held N.I in Moral Reasons the reason that he 
advanced for this claim was different from Moore’s reason. 
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 It is therefore crucial to understand the distinction that Dancy is drawing between (i) and (ii). The 
sort of part that Dancy has in mind when describing (i) as “necessary for the whole to have the 
value it does” are what he describes as enabling conditions. Dancy takes the example of friendship 
as it occurs in the film The Truman Show where everyone, except Truman, are aware that they are 
actors. Although friendship generally has a positive value, in this case it does not because all 
Truman’s relationships are based on a sham. Dancy claims, “what is of value about a friendship 
would have no value if that friendship was a sham, but that it is not a sham is not part of what 
makes the friendship worthwhile. Genuineness is an enabling condition here, not a ground.”xliii
 
Presumably, the idea is that the value of the friendship in this particular context or whole can 
change from its normal value without there being any change in the grounds or features of the 
relationship that make it a friendship but on the basis of something else about this context, namely 
that it is a pretence or a sham. The thought would be that Moore could not accept this since in 
holding “local supervenience” he could not allow for a change in the value of friendship without 
positing a change in the features that grounded that value. However, Dancy’s doctrine of “global 
supervenience” allows a change in the value of friendship if there are other changes in the context 
but these need not be changes in the features that grounded the value but in other features such as 
these enabling conditions instead. In this case then, as we can see in the quotation above, “that it is 
not a sham” is not part of the ground for friendship. 
 
If we interpret parts in the sense of (ii) when N.I. becomes false then, as I mentioned in discussing 
Dancy’s position in Moral Reasons, the second part of his characterization of particularism will no 
longer be correct. It would only be correct if by parts we mean either (i) or both (i) and (ii). 
However, to distinguish between (i) and (ii) seems itself to be atomistic. Why should these parts be 
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separated? A judgemental generalist approaching this situation would not have to take it as a case 
of friendship and then point out that in fact the friendship is a pretence as though this is some 
separate component that counts against the positive value that friendship might be thought to 
contribute otherwise. The generalist, as I mentioned earlier, would exercise judgement and come to 
the global judgement that Truman’s relationships are not genuine friendships where there is no 
reason to divide this into two components. Friendship has not changed its polarity here because this 
is not a case of genuine friendship just as in the borrowing book cases this was not a genuine case 
of borrowing. 
 
In fact, Dancy’s atomistic analysis of the parts of the whole is a feature of his view that appears to 
be more generalist than the one that I am advocating. This becomes apparent when he makes it 
clear that he is advocating a moderate form of holism where certain features can possess what he 
calls “default value”. Thus, for example, friendship could be supposed to possess a positive default 
value, “causing needless pain”, a negative default value and “the train is about to leave” which does 
not have a default value.xliv The context might change the values of those features that have a 
default value or result in the acquisition of value by those features that do not have a default value. 
 
This seems remarkably like the form of generalism that I have called subsumptive generalism 
where we have certain general principles such as “friendship is a virtue” and “causing needless pain 
is wrong” and these are uncritically assumed to be applicable to the particular situation. After they 
have been entered in this form, Dancy’s particularism kicks in with the claim that the overall 
context might lead them to have a different value to their normal one. The form of generalism that I 
was proposing was one where the judgement about what sort of case we have is made prior to the 
application of principles rather than applying these principles (or default values) and then claiming 
that if their value changes from their normal default value then this can be explained by other 
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“parts” of the overall context that can be labelled “enabling conditions”. Indeed, further remarks by 
Dancy reinforce this impression of generalism because a special explanation is required if a feature 
that has a default value does not have that value in a particular context. His analysis of particular 
situations involves an initial “looking away” from the particular situation and then evaluating the 
particular case in terms set up as a result of this initial “looking away.” 
 
A possible reply that Dancy might make to this point can be taken from his recent discussion of 
these issues in the area of reasons.xlv Here Dancy has presented an even more complicated picture 
than that which we have so far been considering in his discussion of the value of wholes and their 
parts. I shall take the following example of practical reasoning that he gives to illustrate some of 
these new complexities. 
 
(1) I promised to do it. 
(2) My promise was not given under duress. 
(3) I am able to do it. 
(4) There is no greater reason not to do it. 
(5) So I do it.xlvi 
 
Here (1) is described as a reason in favour or, as Dancy describes it, a “favourer” and is the only 
reason in this case. In the language of the value of wholes, this would presumably be equivalent to 
those parts that I labelled (ii), being those parts of the whole that do contribute value to the whole. 
(2) and (3) are both enabling conditions and thus like the parts that I labelled (i). The distinction 
between (2) and (3) is between a specific enabler and a general enabler where the former is 
something specific to promising and the latter would apply to the larger class of all my actions. 
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Condition (4) is neither a favourer nor an enabler but is described by Dancy as being verdictive 
because it is a judgment on the balance of reasons present in the case. 
 
One reason that Dancy gives for this sort of breakdown is that if we took a more global view 
initially such that, for example, the overall favourer would be that I freely made a promise to do 
something that I am able to do and there are no other conflicting considerations, then this would not 
capture something that Dancy thinks we would wish to capture when the enabling conditions fail. 
So, to take Dancy’s example, if a promise was deceitfully extracted then Dancy claims that people 
would  
 
often feel some compunction in not doing what they promised, even though they themselves 
recognise that in such circumstances their promise does not play its normal reason giving 
role. I think their attitude would be different if what plays the reason-giving role were not 
that one promised but that one ‘freely’ promised.xlvii
 
The thought would be that there would be no favourer if the case were described in the second sort 
of way in the deceitful promise example and, therefore, no explanation of the feeling of 
compunction that Dancy says would be felt. 
 
Now this argument does not sit very happily with the original position developed by Dancy in 
Moral Reasons. In his analysis of the book borrowing case there he claimed that I have no reason at 
all to return the book that I had borrowed from you if you had stolen it. This was not described as a 
case where we have an unchanged favourer, returning that which we have borrowed, but that the 
enabling conditions for this favourer are absent in this case. The analysis that he has now moved to 
is almost precisely the sort of analysis that he claimed in Moral Reasons would be given by a 
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generalist. It is not precisely the same since Dancy is drawing a distinction between reasons and 
enabling conditions, but the essence of the point is the same. Dancy clearly claims in Moral 
Reasons that I have no reason at all to return the book since it was stolen by you. 
 
My criticisms of Dancy then need to be distinguished to reflect the change of view between Moral 
Reasons and these two later articles and can be summarised as follows: 
 
(A) If the analysis given in Moral Reasons is accepted, then Dancy will not be able to hold 
N.I. since then the value of the whole will be the same as the contributory parts. In this 
case, his characterisation of particularism is just based on the first point, what is a 
reason in one situation may alter or lose its polarity in another, against which I have 
argued. 
 
(B) If he adopts the sort of position characterised in his later articles then this smacks of the 
sort of subsumptive generalism that I have criticised. The breakdown of cases into 
favourers, enabling conditions, verdictive judgements and even further 
complicationsxlviii encourages an initial “looking away” from the particular situation and 
the application of favourers such as promise keeping which are then reduced in value by 
the presence of “disenabling” conditions such as the promise was not freely given. 
However, there is still a reason to keep the promise according to the later Dancy since 
he considers that this explains the feeling of compunction that he alleges we feel when 
we do not keep the promise. So he would have retained N.I. of contributing parts and 
wholes but at the expense of incorporating a deeply implausible subsumptive generalist 
analysis of the situation. The analysis would require him to reject the first point in his 
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characterisation of particularism in Moral Reasons since the reasons bring with them 
their normal default value to the situation.  
 
Hence, neither (A) nor (B) will allow him to retain the initial characterisation of particularism given 
in Moral Reasons. In addition, Dancy himself admits that there is no way at a theoretical level to 
determine whether his or Moore’s account of supervenience is correct in isolation from the 
consideration of particular cases. However, if my interpretation of Dancy’s second point in his 
characterisation of holism is as characterised in (A) above, then this just collapses into the first 
point. Since, as I have argued, the first point has not been established then there is no reason to 
accept Dancy’s explanation of supervenience. 
 
7. The locus of ethical correctness lies in ethical theories 
These arguments against particularism leave open the possibility that generalism, at least if this is 
understood as judgemental generalism, is correct. Why not accept this rather than claiming that the 
locus of ethical correctness lies in ethical theories? Indeed, what is the distinction between 
generalism and ethical theories, since both seem to be advocating applying something general to 
particular cases? In the course of explaining this, more detail will be given about what is involved 
in the judgemental part of judgemental generalism. 
 
I have already shown that judgemental generalism is a more plausible form of generalism than 
subsumptive generalism, where moral principles are equated with rules that apply in an all or 
nothing fashion. Judgemental generalism has the ineliminable role for judgement in the particular 
case in the respects that I have outlined earlier in the article. However, this still leaves open the 
question of how this judgement is to be exercised. What rationale is being employed to make these 
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judgements? This rationale I will argue is embodied in the ethical theory from which the general 
principles arise. 
 
I shall clarify this point by returning again to an example in Kant’s ethical theory. According to 
Kant, ultimate value is located in rational nature, or, as he also calls this, humanity. Indeed, one of 
the formulations of the Categorical Imperative makes this explicit: “Act in such a way that you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an 
end and never simply as a means.”xlix In terms of Williams’s definition of an ethical theory given 
earlier, the appeal to rational nature as the ultimate end supplies the “general test for the correctness 
of basic ethical beliefs and principles.”l Rational nature will be appealed to as both the ground for 
our general principles and for the judgement about the appropriate description to be given to the 
particular case so that the appropriate general principle is applied. As noted earlier, Kant writes, “an 
act of judgement by which a practitioner distinguishes whether or not something is a case of the 
rule.”li
 
So, if we take an example mentioned earlier of whether or not killing oneself after having been 
bitten by a rabid dog counts as a case of suicide or not harming others, then our guiding rationale 
will be to consider which of these would count as respecting rational nature in this particular case. 
It is the ultimate standard of ethical correctness embodied in Kant’s ethical theory that provides the 
rationale for the general principles that we are bring to the particular cases and for the judgement 
necessary to understand which principles are applicable in a particular case. 
 
Why should we accept that this is where the locus of ethical correctness is to be located? It seems 
to be a natural extension of judgemental generalism in its explicit inclusion of the rationale for this 
form of generalism. I have also given reasons for rejecting the support that Dancy offers for 
 27
particularism. However, there may be the lingering suspicion that somehow a direct confrontation 
with the particular case without any intervening ethical theory is where ethical correctness lies. 
 
However, as Martha Nussbaum has convincingly pointed out, this direct confrontation, with what 
she calls concrete ethical practice, is itself based on theory. She says: 
 
People who don’t think about the Kantian/Rawlsian theory … do not therefore simply go 
out and relate to one another in accordance with refined particular perceptions. Their mutual 
interactions are governed by a variety of theories, some metaphysical and religious, some 
customary.lii  
 
Some of these theories are, she claims bad theories. They are often neither explicitly formulated nor 
been subjected to critical reflection. Discovering the locus of ethical correctness in an explicitly 
articulated theory is clearly to be preferred to this. This will enable consistent judgements to be 
made based on explicitly articulated theory. Indeed, in order to distinguish the sort of ethical theory 
that I am advocating from the uncritical acceptance of theories built into concrete ethical practice, 
Williams’ definition given earlier needs to be supplemented to make it clear that the ethical theory 
is one where we have a general account that is explicitly articulated. 
 
Where I disagree with Nussbaum is in the contrast that she draws between this concrete ethical 
practice that is based on bad theories and “refined ethical practice”, where she appears to suggest 
that we can dispense with theories altogether. Indeed, the implication is that the “sphere governed 
… by fine tuned Jamesian perceptions”liii is not influenced by any theories whatsoever. These fine 
tuned perceptions are appealed to as a necessary supplement to the Aristotelian theory since they 
“make out the force of such obscure claims as the claim that ‘the discernment rests with 
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perception’.”liv However, no argument is advanced for why these should be distinguished from 
concrete ethical practice, some of which is based on bad theories or, at the very least, unexamined 
implicit theories. Why should the “finely tuned perception” in the novels of Henry James be 
uninfluenced by bad theories? Indeed, given some of the conclusions reached in his novels, he is 
advocating what might be viewed both critically and uncritically as immoral behaviour.lv There is 
no reason to take these as standards of ethical correctness. 
 
Nussbaum points out that these novels give us both an horizontal and vertical extension of ordinary 
life and enable an appreciation of the emotions involved without the distraction of personal 
jealousies or biases. However, why should we suppose that reading these novels would give us the 
fine tuned perception necessary to get things right in ordinary life? Why should we assume that this 
sort of training in “right perception” has not incorporated bad theories? Are we to suppose that 
novelists such as James, Dickens or Proust are immune from the bad theories that characterise other 
areas of concrete ethical practice? There is no argument advanced why this finely tuned perception 
should be taken as the standard of ethical correctness any more than what Nussbaum calls ethical 
practice, which, by her own admission, is based on bad theories. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that the essence of the dispute between particularists and generalists lies in where 
ethical correctness is located. The arguments advanced have rejected locating this in the particular. 
However, generalism alone is not enough. The guiding rationale of an explicitly articulated ethical 
theory in which these general principles are located is where we should look for our standard of 
ethical correctness.lvi
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